Applying Twenty-Five Years of Experience: The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act by Albertson, Kirk
American Indian Law Review
Volume 29 | Number 1
1-1-2004
Applying Twenty-Five Years of Experience: The
Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act
Kirk Albertson
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Family Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the State and
Local Government Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kirk Albertson, Applying Twenty-Five Years of Experience: The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act, 29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 193 (2004),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss1/8
SPECIAL FEATURES
APPLYING TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: THE
IOWA INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
Kirk Albertson*
Let us put our minds together and see what kind of life we can
build for our children.
- Sitting Bull, Hunkpapa Sioux'
L Introduction
On May 30, 2003, Iowa Governor Tom Vilsack signed into law the Iowa
Indian Child Welfare Act.' The purpose of the Act is to supplement the
Federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA),3 which provides minimum
federal standards for child custody proceedings involving Indian children.
This legislation was passed amid concerns about Iowa's implementation of
ICWA and the state's child welfare system. The Iowa ICWA repeats much of
the language of the Federal Act, but it also seeks to clarify provisions of the
Federal ICWA as it applies to Iowa. The intent of the Act is primarily to
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holds a B.S., 2001, from the University of Colorado and is an enrolled member of the Turtle
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, Belcourt, North Dakota.
The author wishes to thank Professor Ann Estin of the University of Iowa College of Law
for her guidance and encouragement. Thanks also to the American Indian Law Review and the
National Native American Law Student Association for sponsoring the Indian law writing
competition.
First-place winner, 2003-04 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE
CUSTODY AND ADOPTIONOFNATIVE AMERICANCHILDREN 1, 8 (1995) ("Sitting Bull apparently
made this statement upon his return from exile in Canada, when it was becoming apparent that
the nomadic lifestyle of his Hunkpapa people was being proscribed by the white settlers.").
2. IOWA CODE §§ 232B.1-14 (2003).
3. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(2000)).
4. IOWA CODE § 232B.2 ("The purpose of the Iowa Indian [Clhild [Wielfare Act is to
clarify state policies and procedures regarding implementation of the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act. It is the policy of the state to cooperate fully with Indian tribes and tribal citizens
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limit the ability of state court judges to avoid applying ICWA. However, the
Iowa ICWA also includes provisions that redefine the application of ICWA
and impose new requirements on courts and parties seeking placement. This
article examines the history of the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act, its
provisions, and its affect on the application of the Federal ICWA.
The Indian Child Welfare Act was a controversial and groundbreaking
piece of legislation when it was passed. It sought to strike a balance between
state and tribal sovereignty and between the interests of Indian children and
society at large. Recognizing that ICWA was by no means perfect, and
drawing on twenty-five years of case law, Iowa sought to strengthen ICWA
and fill in the gaps. In doing so, it has significantly raised the level of
protection for Indian tribes and for Indian children and their parents. It has
also raised questions about the ability of a state to redefine critical terms of
ICWA. In the final analysis, the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act is a landmark
piece of legislation that provides greater protection to Indian tribes and
families.
II. Background
The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978' was enacted to halt rampant state
and private child welfare abuses that had resulted in a tremendous number of
Indian children being removed from their homes.6 In the mid-1970s,
congressional hearings revealed an alarming rate of Indian children being
taken from their families and tribes "by non-tribal public and private agencies
and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-
Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions."7 Studies presented in the
hearings showed that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children
had been removed from their families. Witness also testified to "the serious
adjustment problems encountered by such children during adolescence." 9
Summing up the problem, one witness testified that, "[c]ulturally, the chances
in Iowa in order to ensure that the intent and provisions of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
are enforced.").
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.
6. Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 601 (2002).
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).
8. Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong. 15 (1974) (statement of William Byler,
Executive Director, Association of American Indian Affairs, Inc.).




of Indian survival are significantly reduced if our children, the only real means
for the transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes
and denied exposure to the ways of their People."'
The Indian Child Welfare Act sought to reverse this practice by making it
the policy of the United States "to protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families."" At
the core of this protection is the grant of exclusive tribal jurisdiction in
proceedings involving an Indian child domiciled on the reservation.'" The Act
also introduces a number of protections for Indian children and parents in
child custody proceedings. These protections include: a right of intervention
for Indian parents and tribes;' 3 the tribe's right to notice of involuntary
proceedings where the court has reason to know that an Indian child is
involved; 4 a requirement that states transfer proceedings to the child's tribal
court; ' 5and guidelines for placement of Indian children in foster and adoptive
placements.16
Notwithstanding the policy of the Act, state courts often misinterpret
ICWA, disagreeing about when it should be applied and what it requires.
State courts have created exceptions to the applicability of ICWA, most
notably the "existing Indian family" exception. 7 They have also created their
own definitions of terms contained in the Act, which further blunts the
effectiveness of ICWA. State courts have taken great liberty with the "good
cause" language in § 1915 to deviate from the stated placement preferences.
For example, in In re Juvenile Action No. 2-25525,18 the court of appeals in
10. Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs and Public Lands of the
House Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) (testimony of Mr. Calvin
Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the
National Tribal Chairmen's Association).
11. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
12. Id. § 1911(a).
13. Under id. § 191 1(c), "the Indian custodian of the child and the Indian child's tribe shall
have a right to intervene at any point" in a state court proceeding for foster care placement or
termination of parental rights.
14. Id. § 1912(a).
15. Id. § 1911 (b). In cases where the Indian child does not live on the reservation, the state
court is required to transfer the case to the tribal court, absent a showing of good cause.
16. Id. § 1915(a), (b).
17. The Kansas Supreme Court created this exception in In re Adoption of Baby Boy L, 643
P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982), where a non-Indian mother petitioned to terminate the parental rights of
an Indian father. The court reasoned that ICWA was not applicable because the child had not
been removed from an existing Indian family.
18. In re Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
No. 1]
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Arizona interpreted "good cause" to allow for a "best interests of the child"
analysis. The court found good cause to deviate from the placement
preferences because it was in the best interests of the child to remain with the
adoptive mother, whom the baby girl had resided with for three years.' 9 State
courts have also created their own interpretations of the "good cause"
provision in § 1911 to deny removal of cases to tribal court.2" Despite the
inconsistent application of the Act, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided only
one case involving ICWA. In Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v.
Holyfield,2  the Court considered the adoption of twin babies, born off the
reservation to unwed parents who were both enrolled members and
domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation. The Mississippi Supreme Court
found ICWA inapplicable since the twins never resided or were "domiciled"
on the reservation.2 The court reversed, finding that Congress had not
intended for state courts to define critical terms of ICWA.23 Reasoning that
the potential for inconsistent definitions was great, the court declared,
"Congress could hardly have intended the lack of nationwide uniformity that
would result from state-law definitions of domicile.,
24
The Holyfield decision, however, has not prevented state courts from
inconsistently interpreting and applying ICWA. As a result of the inconsistent
application of the Act and the continuing high rates of Indian children being
removed from their homes, tribes and lawmakers have argued for the need to
amend ICWA.2 ' At least fourteen bills to amend ICWA have been introduced
in Congress. 26 Only one of the proposed amendments, however, have come
19. Id.
20. See In re M.E.M., 725 P.2d 212 (Mont. 1986). The Montana Supreme Court used a
"best interests" test to find good cause not to transfer the case to the tribe. The court
rationalized that removing a child from his or her present living situation could be
psychologically damaging.
21. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
22. Id. at 39.
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. at 45.
25. See generally Christine Metteer, Hard Cases Making Bad Law: The Need for Revision
of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 419 (1998).
26. Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 1987, S. 1976, 100th Cong. (1987); To
amend the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 to require that determinations regarding status as
an Indian child and as a member of an Indian tribe be prospective from the date of birth of the
child and of tribal membership of the member, and for other purposes, H.R. 1448, 104th Cong.
(1995); Indian Child Welfare Improvement Act of 1995, S. 764, 104th Cong. (1995); To amend
the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 to exempt voluntary child custody proceedings from




to the floor for a vote, and ICWA has never been amended."7 In the absence
of federal direction, several states have enacted supplemental legislation to
make the implementation of ICWA more effective.28 These statutes have
largely served to clarify state policies and procedures regarding
implementation of the federal ICWA. 29 However, in addition to clarifying
procedures, Minnesota has required heightened determination and notice
requirements for voluntary placements.3 °
Amid this backdrop, Iowa is an unlikely ICWA battleground. According
to the 2000 U.S. Census, less than ten thousand of Iowa's 2.9 million residents
are Native American. The Sac and Fox Reservation (known as the Mesquakie
Indian Settlement) is the only federally recognized reservation in Iowa.
Although it is not located near the Mesquakie Settlement, Woodbury County
is home to the largest Indian population in the state.3 The largest city in
Woodbury County, Sioux City, attracts residents from the nearby Winnebago
and Omaha Indian reservations in Nebraska. It is here that the battle over
ICWA rages. In 2003, the rate of Indian children placed in foster care in
Woodbury County was seven times greater than the rate for white children.32
In the fall of 2003, more than 200 people marched from South Sioux City,
Neb., across the bridge into Iowa to protest the abuses in the state's child
welfare system.3 3 Indeed, the Iowa child welfare system's problems run much
Indian Child Welfare Act to exempt from coverage of the act child custody proceedings
involving a child whose parents do not maintain significant social, cultural, or political
affiliation with the tribe of which the parents are members, and for other purposes, H.R. 3275,
104th Cong. (1996); Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 1996, H.R. 3828, S. 1962, 104th
Cong. (1996); Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 1997, H.R. 1082, S.569, 105th Cong.
(1997); To amend the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 to exempt voluntary child custody
proceedings from coverage under that Act, and for other purposes, H.R. 1957, 105th Cong.
(1997); Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 1999, S. 1213, 106th Cong. (1999); Indian
Child Welfare Act Amendments of 2001, H.R. 2644, 107th Cong. (2001); Indian Child Welfare
Act Amendments of 2002, H.R. 4733, 107th Cong. (2002); Indian Child Welfare Act
Amendments of 2003, H.R. 2750, 108th Cong. (2003).
27. Indian Child Welfare Act Amendments of 1996, S. 1962,104th Cong. (1996). The bill
was introduced in the Senate by Sen. John McCain, R.-Ariz., and passed by unanimous consent
on September 26, 1996. 142 CONG. REC. S 11458 (1996).
28. See, for example, Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § § 43-1501 to
43-1516 (2003); Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 40-40.9 (2001).
29. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-1502 (2003); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 40.1 (2001).
30. See Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act, MINN. STAT. § 260.751-.835 (1999).
31. Jennifer Dukes Lee, American Indians: "We Have Had Enough," DES MOINES
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deeper than its handling of placement of Indian children. Beset by budget
shortfalls and ineffective foster-care system, Iowa has resorted to massive
budget cuts and restructuring to handle the crisis.34 While the debate over
how to provide cheaper, family-friendly foster care continued, the state quietly
enacted the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act.
III. The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act
A. The Statute
The Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act 35 is similar to statutes passed by other
states in the heightened standard of protection it provides and the
clarifications it includes. It provides a universal presumption of tribal
jurisdiction," more stringent notice requirements," and stricter definitions of
several terms. The Act seeks to make the application of ICWA as broad as
possible and to provide maximum protection to Indian parents and tribes.
However, the Act also includes provisions substantively different from ICWA,
which call into question whether Iowa has made the interests of the tribe the
primary consideration in child protection proceedings.
B. Definitions
While much of the Iowa ICWA repeats the language of the federal ICWA,
it modifies several definitions from the Federal Act. First, under the federal
ICWA, an Indian is "any person who is a member of an Indian tribe, or who
is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional Corporation."38 Iowa's
definition, in addition to the federal definition, includes a person who is
"eligible for membership in an Indian tribe."39 Second, the federal ICWA
defines an "Indian child" to be "any unmarried person who is under age
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for
membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
34. Lee Rood, Iowa's Reform of Child Welfare, DES MOINES REGISTER, June 10, 2003, at
LA.
35. IOWA CODE §§ 232B.1-14 (2003).
36. Id. § 232B.5(10) ("Unless either of an Indian child's parents objects, in any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who is not domiciled or residing within the
jurisdiction of the Indian child's tribe, the court shall transfer the proceeding to the jurisdiction
of the Indian child's tribe [upon petition].").
37. See id. § 232B.5(4), (8) (requiring notice for voluntary as well as involuntary
proceedings).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2000).




Indian tribe. 4° Iowa, however, employing a more inclusive and ambiguous
definition, defines and "Indian child" to be "an unmarried Indian person who
is under eighteen years of age or a child who is under eighteen of age that an
Indian tribe identifies as a child of the tribe's community."'4' Third, the Iowa
Act provides a broader definition of "extended family member" than does the
Federal Act. While both statutes include siblings, grandparents, aunts, uncles,
and cousins as members of the extended family, the Iowa definition also
includes "clan members" and "band members. '42 This becomes an important
difference as both statutes list family members as the primary placement
preference in both adoptive and foster care placements.43
C. Determining Indian Status and Notice Requirements
Iowa ICWA also imposes additional burdens on the court and parties to the
case to ensure Indian children are identified early in the proceeding. While
the federal ICWA is unclear about determining when an Indian child is
involved, the Iowa Act provides specific requirements for determination and
requires that the determination "be made as soon as practicable in order to
serve the best interest of the child and to ensure compliance with the notice
requirements of this chapter." 44 First, the Iowa Act requires the party
initiating the proceeding to determine whether the child is an Indian child.
45
The Act provides that:
The court shall require a party seeking the foster care placement of,
termination of parental rights over, or the adoption of, an Indian
child to seek to determine whether the child is an Indian child
through contact with an Indian tribe in which the child may be a
member or eligible for membership, the child' s parent, any person
who has custody of the child or with whom the child resides, and
any other person that reasonably can be expected to have
information regarding the child's possible membership or
eligibility for membership in an Indian tribe, including but not
limited to the United States Department of the Interior.46
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
41. IowA CODE § 232B.3(6).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); IOWA CODE § 232B.3(7).
43. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (b)(1); IOWA CODE § 232B.9(1)(a), (2)(a).
44. IowA CODE § 232B.4(4).
45. Id. § 232B.4(2).
46. Id.
No. 1]
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Second, Iowa ICWA contains several instances to indicate when a court or
party to a proceeding shall be deemed to know or have reason to know that an
Indian child is involved: 1) the court or a party to the proceeding has been
informed that the child is or may be an Indian child; 2) the subject child gives
the court reason to believe (s)he is an Indian child; or 3) the court or a party
to the proceeding has reason to believe the residence/domicile of the child is
in a predominantly Indian community.47 This provision is particularly
important as it pertains to the federal notice requirement "where the court
knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. 48
Third, Iowa ICWA imposes a broader notice requirement than the minimum
standards of the federal ICWA. While both the federal ICWA and Iowa
ICWA require notice to the child's parents, Indian custodian, and tribe for
involuntary foster care placement, or termination proceedings, the Iowa ICWA
also requires notice to all of these parties for any voluntary proceedings.49
Furthermore, while the federal ICWA only requires notice "of the pending
proceedings and of their right of intervention,"" ° the Iowa ICWA includes
numerous items that must be included in the notice "in clear and
understandable language."" These include: (a) "The name and tribal
affiliation of the Indian child, (b) A copy of the petition by which the
proceeding was initiated, and (c) A statement listing the rights of the child's
parents, Indian custodians, and tribes and, if applicable, the rights of the
Indian child's family.' '52
D. Jurisdiction and Intervention
Iowa ICWA also contains substantive differences in its jurisdictional and
permissive intervention provisions. Both the federal ICWA and the Iowa
ICWA allow for circumstances of exclusive tribal jurisdiction and concurrent
state-tribal jurisdiction. Under both statutes, exclusive tribal jurisdiction is
limited to proceedings involving a child residing on the reservation.53
Concurrent jurisdiction is provided for by the removal provisions of each
47. Id. § 232B.5(3).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
49. Id. ; IowA CODE § 232B.5(4), (8). The Iowa Code also broadens the tribal notice
requirement to include "any tribe in which the child may be a member or eligible for
membership."
50. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
51. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(7).
52. Id.




statute, which require removal absent a showing of "good cause. 54 However,
while the federal ICWA limits concurrent jurisdiction to foster care
placements and termination of parental rights, Iowa ICWA grants concurrent
jurisdiction for any custody proceeding, which includes adoption proceedings
as well as foster care placements and termination of parental rights. Iowa
ICWA includes a similar provision with regard to intervention. While federal
ICWA only allows for tribal intervention in foster care placements and
termination of parental rights,56 Iowa ICWA also allows tribes to intervene in
adoption proceedings.5 7
In addition, Iowa ICWA also strictly limits what constitutes "good cause"
for state courts to decline to transfer proceedings to tribal courts. While the
federal ICWA provides no definition of "good cause," the Bureau of Indian
Affairs has provided guidelines for determining when good cause exists.
These include the following circumstances: (1) the proceeding was at an
advanced stage when the petition for transfer was received and the tribe did
not file promptly after receiving notice, (2) transfer would cause undue
hardship to the parties or witnesses, and (3) the parents of the child are
unavailable and the child has little or no tribal contact.58 Under Iowa ICWA,
however, a court may find good cause to deny transfer only in the following
circumstances: (1) the tribal court declines the transfer, (2) the tribal court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction, or (3) transfer would cause undue
hardship to the parties or the witnesses.59 Furthermore, Iowa ICWA dictates
that any objection to transfer to tribal court should be rejected, as it would
"prevent maintaining the vital relationship between Indian tribes and the
tribes' children and would interfere with the policy that the best interest of an
Indian child require that the child be placed in a foster or adoptive home that
54. Under 25 U.S.C § 1911(b) (2000), the state court,
in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the
jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of
either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, that
such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.
Id.
55. Id.; IOWACODE § 232B.5(10).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).
57. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(14).
58. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,583,
67,591 (1979). While most states have followed the guidelines, they have used varying
interpretations.
59. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(13).
No. 1]
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reflects the unique values of Indian culture."6
E. Placement
Iowa ICWA also includes several new procedural requirements for state
courts in custody proceedings involving Indian children. First, the Act
requires any person or court involved in a custody proceeding to use the
services of the child's tribe in seeking to secure placement.6' Second, while
both statutes require parties seeking involuntary foster care placement or
termination of parental rights to provide evidence of "active efforts" at
remediation and rehabilitation that proved unsuccessful, Iowa ICWA
substantially limits the definition of "active efforts." Evidence of active
efforts must demonstrate "a vigorous and concerted level of casework beyond
the level that typically constitutes reasonable efforts.... Reasonable efforts
shall not be construed to be active efforts. 62
Iowa ICWA also contains several provisions with regard to placement
preferences that differ from the Federal Act. First, while both the federal and
Iowa Acts provide a list of placement preferences, Iowa ICWA does not allow
the court to deviate from the stated preference for "good cause." Under 25
U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b), in any adoptive, foster care, or adoptive placement,
"a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary," to
the stated preferences. Iowa ICWA omits this possibility.63 The Iowa Act also
includes a pair of additions to the placement preferences for adoptive or
permanent placement: a non-Indian family approved by the Indian child's
tribe, and a non-Indian family committed to enabling extended family
visitation and participation in cultural and ceremonial events of the child's
tribe.64 The Act includes similar additionsfor foster care or preadoptive
placement.65
IV. Analysis
Article Ell, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress
the authority to "To regulate Commerce... with Indian Tribes. 6 6 The Indian
Child Welfare Act further states that "through this and other constitutional
60. Id. § 232B.5(11).
61. Id. § 232B.5(18).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000); IOWA CODE 232B.5(19).
63. IOWA CODE § 232B.9(1), (2).
64. Id. § 232B.9(l)(d), (e).
65. Id. § 232B.9(2)(d), (e).




authority, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs."67 This declaration
of the full power of Congress to regulate Indian affairs raises the question of
whether, and to what degree, Congress preempted state law in the area of
ICWA. By its own language, ICWA "did not preempt the entire field of
family law relating to Indian children. 68 Rather, it established "minimum
Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and
the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes" to ensure respect
for Indian culture and families.69 States remain free to enact legislation that
"provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian
custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under [ICWA]." 7 °
Noticeably absent from § 1921 is language allowing states to provide a higher
standard of protection for Indian tribes. While much of the Iowa ICWA
provides greater protection for parents and children, several provisions appear
to provide greater protection to the tribe only. Thus, these provisions may
arguably be preempted by the federal ICWA.
A. Broader Application
The requirements of Iowa ICWA operate to maximize the protection
provided for Indian children and families under the federal ICWA. It also
drastically curtails the ability of state courts to avoid application of the Act or
its various obligations. As previously discussed, Iowa ICWA's definitions of
"Indian" and "Indian child" are more inclusive than the federal act to ensure
that Indian child custody proceedings are adjudicated under ICWA. This
prevents courts from making their own determinations as to whether a child
is "Indian" within the meaning of ICWA. By leaving to the tribe to determine
who is a "child of the tribe's community," the Act recognizes that the tribe is
"the ultimate authority on eligibility for tribal membership." 71 However, the
broader definition may include children that Congress never intended to be
subject to ICWA. Under the Iowa Act, a child may be subject to ICWA even
if neither the child nor their parents is a member of an Indian tribe. At least
one court has held that the federal ICWA definition of "Indian child" was the
only valid definition. In State ex rel. State Office for Services to Children and
Families v. Klamath Tribe,72 the Oregon Court of Appeals invalidated an
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1).
68. In re Adoption of T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973, 979 (Alaska 1989).
69. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
70. Id. § 1921.
71. In re Adoption of Riffle, 902 P.2d 542, 545 (Mont. 1995).
72. State ex rel. Office for Servs. to Children & Families v. Klamath Tribe, 11 P.3d 701
No. 1]
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agreement between the state Department of Services to Children and Indian
tribes in the state to extend the definition of "Indian child" beyond that found
in ICWA. The court held that for purposes of ICWA only Congress could
define who is an "Indian child."73 However, Klamath Tribe involved not a
state law, but an agreement between the state and the tribe. Iowa ICWA is not
an agreement, but a state law providing greater protection that the minimum
standards established by the federal ICWA.
Iowa ICWA also seeks to provide a higher standard of protection through
its determination requirements. While ICWA governs Indian child custody
proceedings, it imposes no requirements on either the courts or the parties to
the proceeding to determine whether a child is an Indian child. If a court does
not "have reason to know that an Indian child is involved,"74 it has no notice
obligation and ICWA doesn't apply. Iowa ICWA imposes a requirement that
the initiating party take steps to determine whether the child is a tribal member
or eligible for membership.75 This includes contacting the child's parents,
custodian, or "any other person that reasonably can be expected to have
information regarding the child's possible membership or eligibility for
membership in an Indian tribe, including but not limited to the United States
[D]epartment of the [I]nterior."76 Further, Iowa ICWA provides
circumstances where a court will be "deemed to know or have reason to know
that an Indian child is involved."77 These include: (1) where the court has
been informed, (2) where the child "gives the court reason to believe the child
is an Indian child," and (3) the court has reason to believe the child lives in an
Indian community."
B. Notice Requirements
The effect of the determination requirements is to virtually guarantee the
court will [have] "reason to know that an Indian child is involved."79 This, in
turn, triggers the notice requirement of the federal ICWA, which is important
because "the tribe's right to assert jurisdiction over the proceeding or to
intervene in it is meaningless if the tribe has no notice that the action is
(Or. Ct. App. 2000).
73. Id. at 707.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
75. IOWA CODE § 232B.4(2) (2003).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 232B.5(3).
78. Id.




pending."" ° Additionally, because some courts have held strict compliance
with the notice requirements of the federal ICWA is not necessary, 8' Iowa
ICWA imposes a series of requirements for giving notice. These requirements
include a list of the rights of the child's parents, custodian and tribe.8"
While the federal ICWA imposes notice requirements for involuntary
proceedings, it is silent with regard to notice for voluntary proceedings.8 3
Iowa ICWA, on the other hand, requires notice for all custody proceedings,
voluntary or involuntary. The federal ICWA's silence on this issue raises the
question of whether Iowa can impose these additional requirements. In
Catholic Social Services Inc. v. C.A.A., 84 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
strict compliance with ICWA prohibited notice to the tribe of a proceeding for
a voluntary termination of parental rights." However, this interpretation of
25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) necessarily limits the right of the tribe to intervene "in
any state court proceeding" under 25 U.S.C. § 191 1(c), suggesting notice is
permissive but not required in voluntary proceedings. Additionally, unlike the
Alaska case, Iowa ICWA provides a statutory basis for giving notice to the
tribe.
C. The Existing Indian Family Exception
An important effect of Iowa ICWA is the elimination of the controversial
"existing Indian family" exception. This exception was created by the Kansas
Supreme Court in the case In re Baby Boy L.86 finding the Act did not apply
to "an illegitimate infant who has never been a member of an Indian home or
culture, ... [and] so long as the mother is alive to object, would probably
80. In re Junious M., 193 Cal Rptr. 40, 42 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
81. See, e.g., In re M.S.S., 936 P.2d 36, 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]echnical
compliance with the act is not required if there has been substantial compliance with the notice
provisions of the ICWA.").
82. Section 232B.5(7)(c) of the Iowa Code requires notice to include a statement of rights
including:
(1) the right to intervene in the proceeding, (2) the right to petition the court to
transfer the proceeding to the tribal court of the Indian child's tribe, (3) the right
to be granted up to an additional twenty days from the receipt of the notice to
prepare for the proceeding, (4) The right to request that the court grant further
extensions of time, and (5) In the case of an extended family member, the right to
intervene and be considered as a preferred placement for the child.
IOWA CODE 232B.5(7)(c).
83. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).
84. 783 P.2d 1159 (Alaska 1989).
85. Id.
86. 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982).
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never become a part of the [father' s] or any other Indian family."87 Several
state courts, interpreting the intent of ICWA, have held the Act does not apply
when a child is not being removed from an Indian family or an Indian cultural
setting." The Supreme Court indirectly confronted the exception in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,89 the Court's only decision
on the application of ICWA. There, the Court determined Congress did not
intend for state courts to be able to define key terms of the Act.90 The
Supreme Court also declared the interests of the parents were not the
controlling factor, stating:
Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911 (a) was not meant to be defeated
by the actions of individual members of the tribe, for Congress was
concerned not solely about the interests of Indian children and
families, but also about the impact on the tribes themselves of the
large numbers of Indian Children adopted by non-Indians. 9'
Although this language suggests a broader application of ICWA, the effect of
Holyfield on the existing Indian family exception is unclear. The South
Dakota Supreme Court has determined Holyfield expressly repudiated the
exception. 92 However, several courts have declared that the existing Indian
family exception comports with ICWA, despite the Holyfield decision.93 The
Washington Supreme Court has even suggested Holyfield supports the
existing Indian family exception.94
While courts have struggled to determine the applicability of the existing
Indian family exception, Iowa ICWA flatly rejects the exception. The revised
definition of "Indian child" operates to take the determination of whether a
child is Indian out of the court's hands and vests it solely with the tribe.95 If
87. Id. at 175.
88. See, e.g., Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650 (S.D. 1987); In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d
1059 (Okla. 1985).
89. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
90. Id. at 49.
91. Id.
92. In re Adoption of Baade, 462 N.W.2d 485 (S.D. 1990).
93. See, e.g., Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W. 2d 257, 263 (Ky. 1996) ("Holyfleld addressed
questions of domicile and did not consider the Existing Indian Family Doctrine. Thus, Holyfield
does not prevent the application of the doctrine here.").
94. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305, 310 (Wash. 1992) ("Holyfield supports our conviction that
ICWA is not applicable when an Indian child is not being removed from an Indian cultural
setting, the natural parents have no substantive ties to a specific tribe, and neither the parents
nor their families have resided or plan to reside within a tribal reservation.").




this implication is insufficient, the Act also expressly repudiates the exception
and makes ICWA universally applicable to proceedings involving an Indian
child. Under section 232B.5(l) of the Iowa Code, "A state court does not
have discretion to determine the applicability of the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act or this chapter to a child custody proceeding based on whether
an Indian child is part of an existing Indian family."96
D. "Good Cause" and Tribal Jurisdiction
The Act's limitations on the "good cause" sections of ICWA drastically
limit a state court's ability to refuse to transfer proceedings. Under the federal
ICWA, state courts must transfer custody proceedings to tribal court absent
objection by either parent or "good cause to the contrary."97 However, even
following the BIA Guidelines, state courts have inconsistently interpreted the
"good cause" requirement. One state court found the timeliness requirement
was not satisfied when there was a five-month delay by the tribe between
receiving notice and petitioning for transfer.98 However, another court
determined a tribe's petition was timely despite a year delay between notice
and petition.99 Presumably because of the heightened notice requirements of
Iowa ICWA, the Act does not include lack of timeliness as good cause not to
transfer. Although this may place a court in a difficult position of having to
transfer very late in the proceeding, the additional notice requirements should
make such instances rare.' 0
The ability of the court to deny transfer due to "undue hardship" is often
used to deny transfer when the parents do not live on the reservation.'O°
However, use of this doctrine severely undermines the "concurrent but
presumptively tribal jurisdiction in the case of children not domiciled on the
reservation," created by § 19 1 (b) of the federal ICWA. °2 As a result, Iowa
96. Id. § 232B.5(1).
97. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (2000).
98. In re Robert T., 246 Cal. Rptr. 168, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
99. In re J.L.P., 870 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Under subsections 232B.4(2) and (4) of the Iowa Code, the party initiating the
proceeding is required to determine whether the child is an Indian child as soon as practicable.
IOWACODE § 232B.4(2), (4). Under section 232B.5(4), the party initiating the proceeding must
give notice to the child's parents, Indian custodians, and any tribe which the child may belong
to. Id. § 232B.5(4).
101. See, for example, Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Ct. App.
1995), where the Texas Court of Appeals denied transfer to an Arizona tribal court because of
the "undue hardship to parties and witnesses" that would result.
102. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).
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ICWA imposes the additional requirement that the tribal court must be unable
to mitigate the hardship through remote communication or other means before
a finding of good cause not to transfer is proper."13
Another widely invoked basis for finding good cause is that transfer is not
in the child's best interests. Although this ground is not included in the BIA
guidelines, courts relying on it have cited the congressional intent of ICWA
to "protect the best interests of Indian children.' 0 4 In In re M.E.M.,' °5 the
Montana Supreme Court found the BIA guidelines were not exclusive and that
the best interests of the child were sufficient to establish good cause not to
transfer. 6 Iowa ICWA specifically addresses the best interests test by stating
that objections to tribal jurisdiction should be rejected when they "interfere
with the policy that the best interest of an Indian child requires that the child
be placed in a foster or adoptive home that reflects the unique values of Indian
culture."'0 7  Thus, Iowa ICWA removes the best interest question by
effectively making the child's best interests coincide with the tribe's best
interests. Indeed, the very limited definition of "good cause" contained in
Iowa ICWA, essentially restricts a finding of good cause to circumstances
where the tribal court is unable to accept jurisdiction. In this way, the state
court has virtually no discretion to find good cause not to transfer.
E. "Good Cause" and Placement Preferences
State courts must also follow the placement preferences outlined in ICWA
absent a showing of good cause.'0 8 While the Act itself does not define "good
cause," the BIA guidelines include the following considerations: (1) the
request of the biological parents or the Indian child if of a sufficient age, (2)
the extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child, as established by
a qualified expert, or (3) the unavailability of suitable families for placement
after a diligent search has been completed.' °9 State courts most often find
good cause to deviate from the Act's placement preferences because they
apply a best interests test, "and then make an Anglo determination of the
103. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(13)(c).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
105. 635 P.2d 1313 (Mont. 1981).
106. Id.
107. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(11) (2003).
108. 25 U.S.C § 1915(a), (b) (2000).





Indian child's best interests."" In In re Adoption of F.H.," I the Alaska
Supreme Court used the best interests test to find good cause to place the child
with non-Indian parents because the adopted mother had bonded with the
child."'
Iowa ICWA employs a number of tactics to eliminate deviation from the
placement preferences for good cause. Most noticeably, the Act simply
eliminates the right of the court to deviate from the placement preferences." 3
The Act also includes "non-Indian families" as an additional placement
preference that does not appear in the Federal ICWA." 4 These sections work
to ensure that, while the best interests of the child will be considered in
placing the child, they will not allow the court to opt out of the placement
preferences. To ensure state courts do not create a best interests exception to
the placement, Iowa ICWA also states that placement according to the
preferences is in the best interests of the child."' Finally, Iowa ICWA
imposes a requirement that an expert witness testify that placement is in the
child's best interests. 116
F. Section 1921 Analysis
While Iowa ICWA adheres to the stated policy of the federal ICWA to
"protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and
security of Indian tribes and families," ' 7 it raises some potential conflicts with
another section of the Act. Under 25 U.S.C. § 1921, courts may apply state
law in a proceeding where the state law "provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child
than the rights provided under" ICWA." 8 While the meaning of this section
is unclear, at least one court has interpreted it to mean that only state laws that
110. Metteer, supra note 25, at 444.
111. 851 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1993).
112. Id. at 1363.
113. Section 232B.9(l) of the Iowa Code provides that "[i]n any adoptive or other
permanent placement of an Indian child, preference shall be given to a placement with one of
the following ...." IOWA CODE § 232B.9(l) (2003). Section 232B.9(2) contains the same
specification with regard to emergency removal, foster care, or preadoptive placement.
114. Id. §§ 232B.9(l)(d), (e), 232B.9(2)(d), (e).
115. Under section 232B.9(3) of the Iowa Code, "To the greatest extent possible, a
placement made in accordance with subsection 1 or 2 shall be made in the best interest of the
child." Id. § 232B.9(3).
116. Id. § 232B.9(4).
117. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000).
118. Id. § 1921.
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provide a higher standard of protection for parents are applicable in ICWA
proceedings. In In re Adoption ofM. T.S.,9 the court invalidated Minnesota's
"best interest of the child" test for placement, reasoning that, because the
statute "did not provide a higher standard of protection to the rights of the
parent or Indian custodian, it is preempted by the ICWA."' 0 While the Iowa
ICWA eliminates any ability to depart from the placement preferences in the
best interests of the child, several provisions appear to value the rights of the
tribe over those of the parent.
Most noticeable is the Iowa ICWA's requirement of notice to the tribe for
voluntary proceedings. 2' While under the federal ICWA parents may
voluntarily terminate parental rights and place their child up for adoption in
state court, Iowa ICWA requires the tribe to be involved in the process. This
suggests a higher standard of protection for the rights of the tribe than for the
rights of the parents. A similar consideration exists with regard to placement
preferences. Iowa ICWA broadens the definition of "family member"'22 and
includes in its placement preferences a" non-Indian family approved by the
Indian child's tribe."'2 3  The Iowa Act's expert testimony requirement
provides an even greater measure of protection to tribes. First, the Act
requires a "qualified expert witness" to testify "regarding whether the tribe's
culture, customs, and laws would support the placement of the child in foster
care or the termination of parental rights."' 2a The Act also requires a
determination by the expert "that continued custody of the child by the parent
or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child.' 121 While this requirement is designed to protect the parents from
arbitrary determinations of the state child welfare system, it also gives great
power to the tribe, of which the expert is likely to be a member.'26 These
provisions operate to all but assure the tribe will have the final say on
placement, including a voluntary adoption. While the Federal Act provides
minimum standards, these sections of Iowa ICWA appear to provide far more
119. 489 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
120. Id. at 288. The relevant portion of the statute involved allowed the court to consider
the fact that separation from the child's current foster home would be initially painful to the
child. The court found that the child's presumed interest weighed more heavily than the wishes
of the parents to violate 25 U.S.C. § 1921.
121. IOWA CODE § 232B.5(8).
122. Id. § 232B.3(7)(f), (g).
123. Id. § 232B.9(1)(d).
124. Id. § 232B.10(2).
125. Id.




protections for tribes than for parents. Indeed, these provisions of Iowa ICWA
would arguably be preempted by the Federal Act, if not for the ability of the
parents to object to transfer.'27 The right of the parents to object to transfer
the proceedings to tribal court helps to ensure that the tribe's interests will not
outweigh the parents' interests.
G. Holyfield Analysis
Iowa ICWA also raises questions with regard to the Holyfield decision. In
that case, the Supreme Court rested its decision on the principle that "[iln the
absence of a plain indication to the contrary .... Congress when it enacts a
statute is not making the application of the federal act dependant on state
law." 28 In holding that state courts were not free to apply their own
definitions of "domicile," the Supreme Court employed two reasons. "First,
and most fundamentally, the purpose of the ICWA gives no reason to believe
that Congress intended to rely on state law for the definition of a critical
term. 29 Second, Congress could hardly have intended the lack of nationwide
uniformity that would result from state-law definitions of domicile."' 3°
Indeed, if Holyfield stands for anything, it is the prospect that Congress
intended for a uniform application of ICWA.'3 ' However, the framework
created by the Iowa Act will operate differently, in some instances very
differently, from other states. Iowa's broader definitions and notice
requirements are the most striking examples of this. For example, in Iowa, an
Indian couple living off the reservation that puts their child up for adoption
will be required to provide notice to the tribe and be subject to the tribe's right
to intervene' 32 Further, the tribe may become involved even if neither parent
is an enrolled tribal member. 33 This is a stark contrast to parents living in
another state being able to place their child up for adoption freely. Such a
disparity seems to directly counter the principle of uniformity adopted
articulated in Holyfield. Furthermore, while the definitions adopted by Iowa
ICWA serve to provide greater protection to Indian tribes, children and
127. Id. § 232B.5(10) ("Unless either of an Indian child's parents objects, in any child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child who is not domiciled or residing within the
jurisdiction of the Indian child's tribe, the court shall transfer the proceeding to the jurisdiction
of the Indian child's tribe.. .
128. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins County, 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971).
129. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44 (1989).
130. Id. at 45.
131. Id. at 47.
132. See IOWA CODE § 232B.5(8); id. § 232B.5(14).
133. See id. § 232B.3(5), (6).
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parents, they also serve to significantly alter the operation of the Federal Act.
The elimination of the good cause to deviate from placement preferences and
the severe curtailment of the good cause to deny transfer changes two
arguably critical terms of the Federal Act.
Perhaps, however, Holyfield is not the solid precedent that it appears to be.
Indeed, while state courts have freely interpreted every provision of the Act,
the Supreme Court has not taken up any more cases involving ICWA. It is
obviously not true that every term in ICWA is a "critical" term. More likely,
critical terms are limited to those that may determine whether ICWA applies
to a given case or not. While the definitions of "Indian" and "Indian child"
may be such terms, "good cause" is probably not. Additionally, why Congress
may have intended a uniform interpretation, it clearly recognized that ICWA
would be interpreted, almost exclusively, by state courts. Hence, where
Congress had intended to define critical terms, it seems to have done so for the
most part, and left the other interpretations to the state courts.
H. Policy Considerations
Putting aside any questions about Iowa's authority to pass such a statute,
Iowa ICWA is a bold step towards effective implementation of federal law.
It eliminates many judge-made doctrines that operate to limit the scope and
effectiveness of ICWA. It clarifies many of the provisions contained in the
Federal Act and provides effective guidelines for interpretation of ICWA. In
doing so, Iowa ICWA recognizes "that the States, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and
judicial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of




If Congress were to enact legislation similar to the Iowa ICWA, it would
likely be hailed by states and Indian tribes alike. The Act has been cited as
model legislation among Indian tribes. 135 Iowa ICWA is very effective in
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2000).
135. Indian Child Welfare Act Seen as Model, DES MoINES REGISTER, Apr. 24, 2003, at
http://desmoinesregister.com/news/stories/c4780934/21086609.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004)
("Sen. Steve Warnstadt, D-Sioux City, said tribes nationally have expressed interest in using
Iowa's Indian Child Welfare Act as a model. The measure, aimed at preserving Indian families
and culture, is believed to be among the strongest of its kind in the nation."). In 2004, a bill that




clarifying the federal ICWA and identifying and eliminating judge-made
exceptions to the federal ICWA. It provides maximum protection to the rights
of tribes and makes clear that placement in accordance with its provisions is
in the best interests of the child. However, the fact that this legislation was
passed subjects it to increased scrutiny because it ads so much to the Federal
Act. It broadens the application of ICWA while simultaneously limiting the
exceptions. The end result is that the Act may be applied very differently in
Iowa than it is in other states. Finally, the real problem with the ICWA has
always been the unwillingness of state courts to enforce it. The march in
Sioux City that took place in November 2003 happened after Iowa ICWA was
passed, and it happened over concerns that neither the Federal Act nor the
Iowa Act was being enforced. 136 There would have been no need for Iowa to
pass its own law if judges were willing to follow the federal ICWA faithfully.
While questions might be raised about Iowa's ability to pass such a law, it
cannot be denied that Iowa has acted in good faith to protect the rights of its
Indian community as well as its Indian families.
211, 79th Leg. (S.D. 2004). The bill was amended, however, and, as enacted, it served only to
establish a commission to study compliance with ICWA.
136. See Rood, supra note 34.
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